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methane-related technologies noted above. The  (possible) sh i f t  from a 
petroleum-dominated global fuel sys tem to a methane-dominated system 
would sure ly  have profound worldwide geopolitical, balance-of-payments, 
defense  and  s e c u r i t y  re la ted ,  and industr ia l-s t ructural  impacts. W e  have 
not y e t  even identified some primary and  many secondary e f fec t s .  
These preliminary resu l t s  of IIASA analyses, a n d  t h e  Inst i tute 's  con- 
tinuing r e s e a r c h  In te res t s  in energy ,  technology. and environmental policy 
issues, culminated in a workshop, held in Sopron, Hungary. involving invited 
special is ts  from b o t h  Eas t  a n d  West. in May 1986. The  primary purpose  of 
this  high-level, b u t  informal, meeting was t o  question, cr i t ic ize,  expand ,  and 
t e s t  IIASA's background hypotheses  and o t h e r  promising r e s e a r c h  t o  d a t e .  
A secondary objective was t o  ident i fy potentially rewarding issues fo r  
f u r t h e r  analysis.  To what e x t e n t  we managed t o  achieve our  objectives t h e  
r e a d e r  may judge from this  book, based in large p a r t  on t h e  se lec ted  and 
edi ted workshop proceedings. 
T.H. Lee 
H. R. L i n d e n  
D.A. Dre y f u s  
T. Vasko 
Laxenburg, Austria 
August 1907 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Dynamic Evolution of 
Methane Technologies 
A. Criibler a n d  N. Nakicenovic  
2.1. Introduction 
The use  of natural  gas has been increasing in many p a r t s  of t h e  world, espe-  
cially in most industrialized countries. A s  a resu l t ,  natural gas has emerged 
as one of t h e  t h r e e  most important sources of energy. ranking th i rd  in t h e  
world a f t e r  oil and  coal, while in t h e  USA i t  is second only t o  oil. Despite 
enormous increases in natural gas consumption and  related improvements i r ~  
production, t ranspor t ,  conversion, distribution, and end-use technologies, 
natural gas is still  considered t h e  "stepchild" of t h e  oil industry - a by- 
product  of oil production. 
This is t h e  more surpris ing considering t h e  promising prospec ts  for 
t h e  widespread use  of natural gas in t h e  future.  Natural gas is c leaner  than 
any o t h e r  fossil energy  source,  and unlike o t h e r  fossil energy  forms. pro- 
duces limited part iculate  and  sulfur  emissions t h a t  can b e  even further- 
reduced by  relatively simple measures. In t h e  pas t ,  most natural gas 
discoveries were incidental t o  oil prospecting. Today, t h e r e  is increasiry 
evidence t h a t  methane may be  more abundant and dis tr ibuted more evenly 
thror~ghout  t h e  world than o t h e r  fossil energy sources.  In fac t ,  estimates o l  
na t r~ra l  gas resources have increased substantially during t h e  last decade.  
However, desp i te  decisive environmental advantages and a potentially abun- 
dant  supply,  t h e  use of natural gas s tagnated during recen t  years .  The gas 
bubble still  pe rs i s t s  because acquiring new markets  tu rned  out t o  be  more 
difficult than had been ant icipated by t h e  promoters of natural gas during 
t h e  p h a s e  of rapid growth t h a t  lasted until a few years  ago. 
Our contention is t h a t  most of t h e  difficulties encountered in at tempts  
t o  increase t h e  use of natural  gas could b e  resolved if specif ic  technologies 
were t o  b e  developed t h a t  a r e  tailored t o  natural gas and a r e  not mere 
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derivatives of oil technologies. In o t h e r  words, a prerequisi te  f o r  t h e  
widespread use of natural  gas in t h e  fu ture  is t h e  increasing decoupling of 
methane technologies from oil technologies. As a consequence, t h e  oil and 
gas industry would eventually split  into two s epa ra t e  ent i t ies .  Before 
embarking on t h e  justification of our  contention, we f l r s t  descr ibe  t h e  evo- 
lution of t h e  ene rgy  system and t h e  dynamics of natural  gas. With th i s  his- 
torical perspect ive,  we t hen  outline t h e  fu tu r e  developments llkely t o  lead 
t o  t h e  separat ion of t h e  oil and gas industry,  and  of oil and  methane tech-  
nologies. 
2.2. Primary Energy Consumption 
A t  t h e  beginning of t h e  nineteenth cen tury ,  t h e  primary energy inputs  were 
fuel wood, agricultural wastes, and mechanical wind and water power, in 
addition t o  animal and human muscle power. Poor a s  th i s  may be,  b y  presen t  
s tandards.  It r ep r e sen t s  a sophist icated system compared t o  earl ier  prac-  
t ices .  A considerable in f ras t ruc ture  of canals and roads was already in 
place fo r  t imber t ranspor t :  mining and  manufacturing were usually associ- 
a t e d  with e labora te  systems of dams and water-wheels: thus,  motive and 
sha f t  power came from d r a f t  animals and hydraulic systems,  and hea t  from 
biomass. In primary energy  terms, fuel wood represen ted  most of t h e  
energy  inputs. 
Figure 2.1 (Nakicenovic, 1984) shows primary energy  consr~mption in 
t h e  world s ince 1860. The da t a  a r e  plot ted on a logarithmic scale  and show 
exponential  growth phases in consumption of t h e  most important sorlrces of 
primary energy  during t h e  last 130 yea r s  in piecewise linear secular  t rends.  
Consumption of fuel wood, once t h e  most important source  of energy.  has 
declined s ince  t h e  beginning of t h e  cen tury ,  although i t s  use  is still  
widespread, especially in t h e  developing p a r t s  of t h e  world. With t h e  
expansion of railroads and t h e  s t e e l  industry and t h e  application of steam 
in general.  coal use  increased exponentially until  t h e  1910s and has oscil- 
la ted eve r  s ince  with an overall lower average growth rate .  Both oil and 
natural  gas were introduced during t h e  1870s, and  t he i r  consumptlon has 
increased,  with even more rapid exponential growth r a t e s  evet- since. In 
f a c t ,  t h e  oil and natural gas curves have t h e  same shape  and almost identi- 
cal growth ra tes :  t h e y  a r e  just sh i f ted  in time b y  about 1 0  t o  15 years .  Oil 
and natural  gas use grew in parallel with t h e  petrochemical industry. t h e  
e lec t r ic i ty  and electr-ical industry,  internal  combustion and e lec t r ic  prime 
movers. Nuclear energy is still  in i t s  ear ly phase  of development; therefore  
t h e  s t e e p  growth r a t e s  prevailing over  t h e  last  decade  may not be  indicative 
of i t s  f u tu r e  role. During r ecen t  years ,  t h e  growth of nuclear energy  has 
declined worldwide to more moderate ra tes .  
Thus, during this 130-year period,  energy consumption did not draw 
equally from all sources,  nor  did t h e  use of all energy  sources increase 
equally. Yet, global primary energy  consumption (including fuel wood) grew 
exponentially a t  an average r a t e  of 2.3% p e r  year .  It  is evident t ha t  t h e  
I : : : ,  , I ; : ; : : : : : I  - 
F i g u r e  2.1. World primary energy consumption. 
Fraction ( f )  
Coal 
/--\A 
Natural gas 
0 
F i g u r e  2.2. World fractional shares of major primary energy sources. 
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older  forms of e n e r g y  have been replaced b y  new ones. Thus, t h e  decl ine of 
t h e  o lder  e n e r g y  sources  was compensated by  t h e  more rapid growth of t h e  
new ones. These  dynamic changes a r e  clear ly s e e n  in F i g u r e  2.2 (Nakiceno- 
vic. 1984). which shows t h e  fractional marke t  s h a r e s  of t h e  five most impor- 
t a n t  pr imary energy  sources  t aken  from F i g u r e  2.1. In terms of fractional 
marke t  s h a r e s ,  coal had a l ready  rep laced  fuel wood during t h e  last  half of 
t h e  n lne teen th  c e n t u r y .  In 1860, fuel wood supplied about  70% of consumed 
energy ,  bu t  b y  t h e  1900s Its s h a r e  had dwindled t o  l i t t le  more than  20%. 
Owing to t h e  insignificant use  of c r u d e  oil a n d  natural  gas  during t h e  last  
c e n t u r y ,  most of t h e  marke t  s h a r e  losses incur red  by  fuel wood were caused 
b y  t h e  rapid increases  of coal's s h a r e  of pr imary energy  - from 30% in 1860 
t o  almost 80% b y  t h e  1900s. By 1910. t h e  rapid increase  in coal use  had 
ceased,  and  during t h e  1920s, a p h a s e  of decl ine set in. This decl ine in t h e  
relat ive s h a r e  of coal  use  resembles t h e  marke t  losses of fuel wood 5 0  y e a r s  
ear l ier .  The  replication of th i s  p a t t e r n  is almost symmetrical because,  a f t e r  
t h e  1920s, bo th  fuel wood and  coal were rep laced  by  s t i l l  newer sources  of 
e n e r g y  - c r u d e  oil a n d  natural  gas. 
2.3. Natural  G a s  in the Global Context  
The  evolution of pr imary e n e r g y  use ,  viewed as  a technological subst i tut ion 
process .  is shown in F i g u r e  2.3 (Nakicenovic. 1984) on a logarithmic plot of 
t h e  fract ional  market  s h a r e s  of t h e  five pr imary energy  sources  (from Fig- 
u r e  2.2). The  fract ional  s h a r e s  (n a r e  not  plot ted direct ly ,  bu t  r a t h e r  a s  
t h e  quant i ty  j/(l-j') t h a t  t ransforms t h e  logistic curve  in to  a s t ra igh t  line 
(i.e.. a s  t h e  l inear  transformation of t h e  logistic function). The quant i ty  is 
t h e  r a t i o  of t h e  market  s h a r e  taken b y  a given energy  s o u r c e  over  t h e  sum 
of t h e  marke t  s h a r e s  of all o t h e r  competing energy  sources.  This form of 
presentat ion reveals  t h e  logistic subst i tut ion p a t h  a s  a n  almost l inear  secu- 
l a r  t r e n d  wlth small annual per tu rba t ions .  Thus, t h e  p r e s e n c e  of l inear  
t r e n d s  in F i g u r e  2.3 indicates  where t h e  fractional subst i tut ion of energy  
sources  follows a logistic curve.  
The model est imates  of t h e  subst i tut ion process  a r e  ex tended  beyond 
t h e  historical per iod u p  t h e  t h e  y e a r  2050 [I]. For such  a n  explorat ive 
"look" in to  t h e  f u t u r e ,  additional assumptions a r e  required because poten- 
tial new competi tors ,  such  as nuclear  and  so la r  energy ,  have not cap tured  
suff icient  marke t  s h a r e s  in t h e  p a s t  t o  allow estimation of t h e i r  penetrat ion 
ra tes .  W e  have assumed a more modest nuclear  penetrat ion r a t e  t h a t  resem- 
bles t h e  historical growth r a t e s  of t h e  introduction of coal, c r u d e  oil, and  
natural  gas  in to  t h e  e n e r g y  system. The nuclear  scenario, t h e r e f o r e ,  
p r e s c r i b e s  a 1% s h a r e  in 1965, a n d  a 3% s h a r e  25 years  l a t e r  in 1990 (in 
1982, t h e  nuclear  s h a r e  in global pr imary energy  consumption was 3.5%). 
For  t h e  n e x t  e n e r g y  source,  which we symbolically call "solfrrs" t o  indicate 
t h e  potential use  of both solar  a n d  fusion energy ,  we have postulated an 
equivalent scenar io  with a 1% s h a r e  in t h e  y e a r  2025. rising t o  3% in 2050. 
f/(l - f) Fraction ( f  
figure 2.3. World primary energy substitution (wlth projections). 
These two assumptions, toge ther  with t h e  dynamics of energy  substitution 
prescr ibed  by pas t  events ,  descr ibe  t h e  resulting evolution of t h e  global 
energy system throughout t h e  f i r s t  half of t h e  n e x t  cen tury .  
The prominent f e a t u r e  in th i s  projection of primary energy  subst i tu-  
tion dynamics in to  t h e  fu ture  is t h e  emergence of natural  gas a s  t h e  dom- 
inant energy  source  during t h e  n e x t  decades.  According t o  F i g u r e  2.3, 
more than  half of all t h e  primary energy  consumed globally will b e  natural 
gas a f t e r  t h e  e n d  of this  cen tury .  This resul t  i l lustrates  t h a t  not only would 
t h e  natural gas bubble be  absorbed in a few years ,  but  t h a t  methane tech-  
nologies would develop in t h e  fu ture ,  creat ing new growth sec tors .  Although 
this resu l t  is unexpec ted  in terms of t h e  numerous energy  deba tes  of t h e  
last 1 0  t o  15 years ,  i t  is perhaps  reassuring t h a t  we may not,  a f t e r  all, have 
to rely on nuclear  o r  a l ternat ive energy  sources fo r  ano ther  50  years  o r  so. 
Instead, t h e  possible fu ture  t h a t  emerges would require  less radical 
changes, but  we still  f ace  a challenging task  t o  develop new technologies 
and t o  improve t h e  performance of those already employed, such a s  d e e p  
drilling, pipelines, and methane conversion into o t h e r  energy  c a r r i e r s  (e.g.. 
e lectr ic i ty  and methanol). Despite t h e  c u r r e n t  difficulties involved i t 1  
expanding t h e  use  of natural gas in a time of worldwide economic slowdowr~ 
and low enet-gy (i.e.. c r u d e  oil) pr ices ,  our  scenar-io paints a d i f fe ren t  pic- 
tu re ,  a lbei t  only in t h e  long run.  
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To gain a b e t t e r  understanding of how such  changes may come about. 
we will f i r s t  investigate t h e  his tory of natural  gas in g r ea t e r  dep th .  
Thereaf te r ,  we r e tu rn  t o  t h e  broader  p ic ture  of primary energy  and t h e  
c rea t ion  of t h e  new growth s ec to r s  t ha t  could emerge from expanding 
methane technologles and t h e i r  use. 
F i g u r e  2.4 shows t h e  his tory of natural  gas production for  t h e  world. 
The sha r e s  of t h e  four  most important producing regions a r e  plot ted s ince 
1900.  North America ( t he  USA and  Canada) was t h e  dominant producer  of 
natural  gas until  1983, being superseded  b y  t h e  Soviet Union during t h e  
subsequent  t h r e e  years .  In fact .  t h e  USA has  produced most of t h e  natural 
gas e v e r  e x t r a c t e d  globally, and  st i l l  continued t o  produce more than half 
until  t h e  mid-1970s. The history of natural gas is. therefore.  closely linked 
t o  t h e  USA. 
F i g u r e  2.4 also shows t h e  model estimates of t h e  actual market shares  
of t h e  four  major producing regions. bu t  t hey  a r e  Included for  illustrative 
purposes only and a r e  not intended t o  indicate llkely fu ture  development. 
Ra ther ,  t hey  indicate t h a t  t h e  actual market sha r e s  of t h e  four producing 
regions fluctuated widely away from t h e  model estimates, especially from 
World War I1 through t h e  1960s. However, t h e  historical t r end  away from 
North American dominance and  toward a more widely dis tr ibuted natural  gas 
production throughout t h e  world should continue, and this  is one  of t h e  
f l ( 1  - f )  Fraction I f )  
crucial issues associated with t h e  fu ture  use of natural gas to which we will 
re turn .  iiowever. we will nex t  analyze t h e  evolution of t h e  natural gas 
industry in t h e  USA, since It has been t h e  dominant producer  and still  is 
t h e  largest  consumer of natural  gas, and because U S  da t a  a r e  readily avail- 
able. 
2.4. Natural Gas in the USA 
The lJSA has a longer recorded history of primary energy use than any- 
where e l se  in t h e  world. Figure  2.5 gives i t s  annual consumption of all fossil 
energy sources. fuel wood, d i rec t  uses of mechanical water power, and 
hydroelectr ic  power s ta r t ing  in 1000. whlle Figure  2.6 (Nakicenovic, 1904 
and 1906) shows t h e  substitution among t he se  energy s w r c e s .  Mechanical 
power (mostly water and some windmills) and hydropower cannot be  seen in 
t h e  f igure due t o  t he i r  low contributlon t o  t h e  total energy supply. They 
I I 
10' 
-USA, Canada 
\ --- 0.90 
1 0.50 
; 0.30 
t USSR. Eastern Eurooe & t 
Figure 2.4. World natural gas production by major regions. (Note Lhat lhe resid- 
ual t o  l ob1  world production was no1 plotted. Therefore, market shares do no1 
add to 1001.) f i g u r e  2.5. US primary energy consumptlon. 
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F ' igure  2.8. US primary energy substitution. 
barely e x c e e d  t h e  1% level fo r  very  s h o r t  per iods and  otherwise fall under  
t h a t  cr i t ical  level. Thus, before  t h e  1820s, fuel wood provided virtually all 
t h e  energy  needs of t h e  USA. Coal e n t e r e d  t h e  competition process  in 1817 
a t  t h e  1% level, and  u p  t o  t h e  1880s t h e  market  was essentialIy based on 
t h e s e  two technologies - whatever gains coal made were t ranslated into 
losses f o r  fuel wood. Wood,  however, remained an important source  of heat  
and power f o r  industrial purposes well in to  t h e  second half of t h e  
n ine teen th  c e n t u r y .  
In t h e  USA, t h e  s team age  began in t h e  fuel wood-based economy. The 
f l r s t  s teamboats  a n d  locomotives were f i red  with wood, which remained t h e  
principal fuel used by  railroads until  about 1870 (Schnrr  and Netscher t .  
1960). The iron industry was a n o t h e r  large wood consumer. Around 1850. 
more than  half of all t h e  iron produced was still  smelted with charcoal.  
Nevertheless ,  during th i s  ea r ly  period of industrialization. t h e  USA was still  
basically a ru ra l  society,  s o  t h a t  t h e  total  amount of fuel wood consumed in 
manufacturing a n d  t ransportat ion was small compared t o  t h e  huge quantities 
used in households. In 1880, t h e  domestic use  of fuel wood still  accounted 
f o r  more than  96% of fuel wood consumed (Schurr  and  Netscher t ,  1960). A t  
t h e  same time, however, coal was already supplying almost half of all energy  
needs,  m o s t  of i t  being used b y  emerging industries. 111 1880, coal supplied 
almost 90% of t h e  fuel used for  smelting iron. The end  of t h e  last c e n t u r y  
t h e r e f o r e  marks t h e  beginning of t h e  industrial development period in t h e  
I J S A .  
The f i r s t  use  of c r u d e  oil and natural  gas In t h e  USA da tes  back t o  t h e  
beginning of t h e  nineteenth cen tury ,  and  during t h e  1880s It reached t h e  1% 
market share .  From then  on, t h e  use  of c r u d e  oil expanded somewhat f a s t e r  
as  time progressed,  and In 1950 c r u d e  011 consumption surpassed t h a t  of 
coal. The use  of natural  gas surpassed  t h a t  of coal nine years  l a te r .  It  
should be noted tha t ,  a s  l a te  a s  t h e  1920s. t h e  use  of c rude  oil was not  much 
larger  than t h e  consumption of fuel wood. 
I t  is remarkable t h a t  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of energy  consumption changed 
most during t h e  period of oil dominance. The 1950s - when 011 became t h e  
dominant source  of energy  - r e p r e s e n t  t h e  beglnning of more intense com- 
petition between var lws  energy  sources both in t h e  USA and  In t h e  world. 
For over 150  years  whichever energy  source dominated t h e  contemporary 
energy supply also contr ibuted more than  half t o  all prlmary energy con- 
sumption - from 1800 t o  1880 th i s  was fuel wood, and  from 1880 t o  1950 i t  
was coal. During t h e  1970s, c r u d e  oil was close t o  achieving a 50% s h a r e ,  but 
before actually surpassing th i s  mark i t s  dominance began t o  decIine. Thus, 
during t h e  last  t h r e e  decades,  t h r e e  important sources of energy  have 
shared  t h e  market,  without a single source havlng overall dominance, which 
d i f fe r s  from t h e  p a t t e r n  observed durlng ear l i e r  periods. 
Figure 2.6 Indicates t h a t ,  a f t e r  t h e  1980s. natural gas would become 
t h e  dominant energy  source. although c r u d e  oil would still  maintain a 
roughly 30% market s h a r e  by  t h e  e n d  of t h e  cen tury .  Similarly a t  t h e  global 
level. fu ture  potential competitors of natural  gas, such  as  nuclear  o r  solar  
energy, have not y e t  cap tured  sufficient market  s h a r e s  t o  allow an estima- 
tion of t h e i r  fu ture  penetrat ion ra tes .  The s ta r t lng  point f o r  market pene- 
tration of nuclear  energy can be  da ted  back t o  t h e  1960s. when nuclear 
power acquired slightly less than  a 1% s h a r e  of primary energy.  Making 
allowance for  f u r t h e r  cancellations of planned power plants  and possible 
decommissioning of those In operation and construction, we have assumed 
tha t  nuclear energy  could a t  most double i t s  c u r r e n t  4% market s h a r e  t o  
about 8% by t h e  y e a r  2000. This leaves natural gas with t h e  lion's s h a r e  of 
primary energy,  advancing i t s  position t o  t h e  dominant energy  source a f t e r  
this cen tury  closes. 
2.5. Dynamics of Oil and Natural Gas 
The earl iest  historical records  of natural gas drilling and use  a r e  repor ted  
in ancient  China, where natural  gas was discovered incidentally during t h e  
drilling of b r ine  wells (cf. Brantly. 1971; Gaz d e  France. 1970 and 1971; and 
Peebles, 1980). These ancient  wells were completed with percussion drills 
and bamboo casings. Some of t h e  oldest wells were r e p o r t e d  by  Confucius in 
600 B.C. t o  have reached 500 meters  and t o  have produced natural gas t h a t  
was t ranspor ted  in bamboo pipes fo r  use in evaporating brine t o  recover  
salt .  By t h e  nineteenth cen tury ,  this  drilling techrlology improved in per -  
formance by almost an o r d e r  of magnitude. Visitors to  China have described 
drilling d e p t h s  of u p  t o  4.000 meters ,  which is comparable t o  t h e  d e p t h s  of 
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many commercial wells today. In f a c t ,  some of t h e  f i r s t  natural  gas 
discoveries in t h e  West were also t h e  resul t  of drilling brine wells. Jus t  a s  
in China, t h e  f i r s t  significant use of natural  gas was t o  d r y  sa l t ,  one  of t h e  
largest  energy  consumers among t h e  modest production processes in t h e  
pre-industrial age. 
2.5.1. Drilling performance and average depth 
Modern drilling technology fo r  oil and  gas developed originally in t h e  
methods used  fo r  b r ine  and water  wells. The  f i r s t  producing oil well was 
completed in 1745, in t h e  French Pechelbronn oil field. Drilling technology 
gradually improved. and by  t h e  1850s. dep th s  of a b w t  600 meters  were 
achieved in France  with d r y  ro t a ry  rigs. In t h e  USA, similar d e p t h s  were 
r eached  during t h e  same period with cable tool rigs. 
The significant advances in drilling technology s ince  t h e  1850s were 
primarily a resu l t  of intensive oil drilling, especially in t h e  USA. Probably 
t h e  most important single innovation in drilling methods was t h e  hydraulic 
r o t a ry  rig, which was introduced around t h e  t u rn  of t h e  cen tury .  The 
dramatic  improvement in t h e  performance of drilling technologies during 
t h e  last  100  years  is illustrated in Figure  2.7, which shows t h e  drilling 
d e p t h  records  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  most important technologies: d r y  ro t a ry  and  
100000 
Rotary rigs 
Rgure 2.7. World drilling depth records 
rod percussion, cable tool, and hydraulic ro ta ry  rigs. The da ta  f o r  this  fig- 
u r e  a r e  taken from Brantly (1971) and Oil a n d  Gas  Journal  (1977). Two 
small-diameter co r e  t e s t  drillings in Germany were excluded from t h e  data. 
one reaching 2.000 meters  in 1893 and t h e  o t h e r  2,240 meters  in 1909. 
because they  were not exploratory wells f o r  commercial productiori of 
hydrocarbons. I t  can be  seen from Figure  2.7 t ha t  both of t h e  new drilling 
technologies were inferior t o  t h e  older  competitor in terms of record depth  
a t  t h e  time of t he i r  introduction. In time, however, t h e  new technology 
overtook t h e  older  one t o  establish and improve t h e  dep th  records.  
In terms of petroleum geology, this t rend  favors natural gas s ince t h e  
probability of finding methane increases with dep th ,  and t ha t  of discovering 
oil decreases.  Between dep th s  of 1.000 meters  t o  a few thousand meters ,  
t h e  hydrocarbon deposits a r e  mostly in t h e  form of c rude  oil. Thereaf te r ,  
t h e  likelihood of oil deposi ts  decreases,  and below 4.000 meters virtually all 
hydrocarbon deposi ts  a r e  methane o r  methane with carbon dioxide (see 
Donat. 1984). Geological evidence and t h e  chemical character is t ics  of 
hydrocarbon compounds indicate a very low probability f o r  t h e  occurrence 
of more complex molecules (crude oil) below the se  dep th s  and an increasirtg 
probability of finding methane a t  g r e a t e r  dep ths  due  t o  high pressure  and 
temperature (see Cold, 1985). 
Colonel Drake \ai 
i A t  = 83 years 
Lone h Star 1 Rogers 
Figure 2.8. U S  maximum depth of exploratory drilling. Data sources: API (1971) 
and IPE (1978 and 1983). 
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Technological progress in drilling, expressed in terms of maximum 
depth ,  indicates that new record wells, if successful, can be expected to  
find methane, not crude oil. In fact ,  virtually all recent record wells or  
deep wells were drilled for natural gas exploration. Thus, it is equally 
interesting to look a t  t he  evolution of record depths drilled during the  last 
100 years for all technologies from Figure  2.7 taken together. Figure  2.8 
shows t h e  exploratory drilling depth  records in the  USA. culminating with 
the  J,one S ta r  1. Rogers, completed during the  1970s. as  the  deepest 
exploratory well drllled. This record will most likely be exceeded in the  
future. Figure  2.8 shows that  t h e  logistic trend in deep drilling would 
t-each an asymptotic depth record exceeding 12.000 meters. 
Thus, while the  decoupling of oil and natural gas technologies is not 
reflected in drilling technologies, since these a r e  still basically identical 
whether the  well is drilled for oil or  gas, most of the  record wells reaching 
depths below a few thousand meters were primarily natural gas wells in the  
Anadarko Basin. This tendency toward deeper exploratory wells should 
favor additional gas discoveries since the  probability of finding oil below 10 
km is virtually zero. In fact ,  most of the  recent technical improvements in 
rigs and drillbits a r e  designed for  deep wells. both scientific research wells 
(such as the  Soviet effort on the  Kola Peninsula) and natural gas prospect- 
ing efforts. A t  t he  same time, ther-e is some indication that ,  a t  greater 
depths,  potentially large unconventional and abiogenic methane deposits 
may be found (see Gold. 1985). The long-term evolution of drilling technolo- 
gies to  deeper  horizons may indeed lead to  the  overwhelming dominance of 
natural gas in successful wells, especially as  the  more readily available oil 
deposits become exhausted. 
1r1 this context, it is interesting t o  note that  these saturation trends 
in drilling depth records cannot be observed for offshore drillings. Figure  
2.9 shows the  worldwide offshore depth records for commercial exploratory 
drilling (API, 1986; IPE. 1983: and Ocean Oil Weekly Report ,  1986). The 
progress achieved since the  first so-called oil shock of 1973 is especially 
noteworthy. Figure  2.9 indicates tha t  a considerable potential exists for a 
fur ther  increase i r~  the  share  of offshore gas production, which cr~rrent ly  
accounts for about 20% of global gas production. I t  has. in fact. been 
estimated that  up t o  40% of the  undiscovered oil and gas reserves may be 
found offshore (Klemme. 1977). 
The evolutior~ of exploratory drilling indicates that  a long-term trend 
toward a higher natural gas-to-oil well ratio can be observed for the USA. 
Although the  conventional exploratory drilling technology reached ra ther  
shallow depths  during the  last century (compared with eight or- more kilome- 
ters  today), nevertheless the  effect  of gradually decoupline methane from 
oil technologies can be observed. The USA has been chosen for study pri- 
marily because of the  availability nf almost complete historical time series 
for drilling activities and because of 1JS technological leader-ship in this 
field since the  beginning of the  industry. 
Total exploration 
Mediterranean ' 1 
Figure 2.9. World waLer depLh records in exploralory drilling. DaLa sources: 
API (1986) and IPE (1983). 
Figure  2.10 shows the  total number of exploratory wells drilled in the  
USA since 1900, subdivided into oil. gas. and dry wells (API, 1971 and 1986). 
Alternative drilling statistics have been compiled by the USGS and pub- 
lished in the  yearly issues of Mineral Resources of the USA. These statis- 
tics indicate a much greater number of gas wells drilled, especially in the 
early period. For instance, the  cumulative number of gas wells drilled up to 
1908 is reported by the  USGS as being 21.300. whereas the  API statistics 
give a cumulative total of 3.185 to the same year. Clarification of such 
differences would require further historical analysis. Service wells are  
excluded from the  drilling statistics used in the  examples. Equally, when 
dealing with these statistics, it is important to  note tha t ,  during the  aarly 
period (i.e., before the  1920s), many natural gas finds, discovered in the 
course of oil exploration, may have been classified as dry  holes, due to the  
lack of a commercial value of a great part of the  deposits discovered. 
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f i g u r e  2.10. USA: number of wells drllled. 
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F Y g u r e  2.11. US share of oil, gas, and dry w e l l s  in  total drillines 
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Despite t he se  possible shortcoming of t h e  official API drilllng s tat is-  
tics, however. F i g u r e  2.10 indicates a large Increase In t h e  total number of 
wells drilled s ince 1900, and  also large fluctuations, with particularly s trong 
dips in drilling activity during t h e  1930s and 1960s. Figure  2.22 shows tha t  
these  fluctuations disappear ,  and strong secular  t rends  emerge. when t h e  
total drilllng e f for t  is viewed a s  a "market nlche" fo r  oil. gas, and d r y  wells. 
Defined in this  way, t h e  sha r e s  of gas and d r y  wells a r e  increasing and t h e  
sha r e  of oil wells is declining. Thus, t h e  decoupling of oil and gas technology 
is manifested implicitly in drilling s tat is t ics .  Although oil wells still  
represen t  t h e  majority of welis drilled, t h e  number of gas wells is on t h e  
increase. Unfortunately. th i s  development has been paralleled by an 
increase of d r y  wells; but  s ince t h e  la te  1960s. t h e r e  a r e  signs of a rever-  
sal, perhaps  indicating t h e  use of improved exploration methods such  a s  
geophysical surveying. 
F i g u r e  2.12 shows t h e  sha r e s  of oil and gas discoveries in productive 
wells by  excluding d r y  wells. This transformation of t h e  substitution pro- 
cess emphasizes t h e  different  historical t rends  in successful oil and gas 
wells. The "market penetration" of gas wells does not exceed t h e  10% 
market sha r e  until t h e  1950s, and t he r ea f t e r  shows a s teady  increase. I t  is 
cur-ious. if perhaps  only coincidental. t h a t  t h e  beginning of this  period of 
more significant increases in t h e  shares  of successful gas wells s t a r t s  dur-  
ing t h e  1950s, t h e  period when t h e  largest improvements in drilling depths  
f l l l  - f )  Fraction ( f )  
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F i g u r e  2 2 2 .  US share of s u c c e s s f u l  oil and gas w e l l s .  
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were achieved, as was illustrated in Figure 2.8 (the inflection point 
occurred in 1951). Based on an extrapolation of the long-term historic 
trend, one might expect for the year- 2000 that slightly over 30% of all suc- 
cessful wells drilled in the USA will yield gas and less than 70% wil l  yield oil, 
compared to a 10: 90% relationship between gas-to-oil finds characteristic of 
the earller period. 
There is no doubt that the historical trends indicate success ratio 
impt-ovements in methane exploration and decreases in oil exploration. 
These long-term trends are  strengthened by the fact that the best perfor- 
mance in exploration wells indicates a further advance of drilling technol- 
ogy to reach depths where only methane can be expected, due to the high 
temperature and pressure conditions. Thus, the best performance in dril- 
ling technology suggests an increasing decoupling of natural gas finds from 
those of oil. An important question is whether similar developments can be 
observed for  the performance of the exploratory drilling in terms of the 
natural gas reserve additions per well or per footage of actual successful 
gas wells completed. 
Figure 2.13 shows a very pronounced change in the secular trend of 
natrlral gas reserve additions after the discovery of the Prudhoe Bay field 
. -  
per well 
-- 
per foot drilled Least squares trend 
. 
line 
. 
F i g u r e  2.1.7. US natural gas reserve additions and dr i l l ing  depth 
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in  1969 (the actual reserve additions are backdated to year of discovery). 
For the figure, the net natural gas reserve additions (from discoveries in  
new fields and pools as well as the extensions and revisions from known 
reservoirs) are compared to the number of successful exploratory gas wells 
(i.e., excluding development wells). Sources of data are  A G A  (1972. 
1975-1979. and 1984) and API (1906). Ever since 1969. the yield per well or 
per footage drilled has been considerably lower than during the 1950s and 
1960s. as shown in the figure. Thus, although the total reserve additions 
started increasing again after 1969, the additions per well or footage drilled 
have been rather constant during the last decade despite increases in the 
share of successful gas wells in the total number of wells drilled (from Fig- 
ure  2.5). 
I t  is perhaps not coincidental that this decrease or lack of improve- 
ment in exploratory natural gas drilling in the USA is accompanled by a sec- 
ular trend change in the average depth drilled (see the least squares trend 
lines in Figure 3.5). The average depth drilled per well increased from 
about 5,000 feet in the early 1950s to about 8,000 feet by 1970. Thereafter. 
it has been decreasing, and currently it is slightly deeper than 6,000 feet. 
Considering the fact that the number of operating rigs has also decreased 
from about 8.000 to less than 2.000. it is not very likely that another trend 
reversal will  occur in the near future. 
Although it is generally danger-ous to attempt an explanation based on 
rather sparse information, it is possible that the decrease in the yield of 
exploratory natural gas drilling may simply be the result of the fact that 
wells are tending to become shallower or that the statistics on discovery 
rates are inaccurate, since it is often a problem of definition as to whether 
a certain well is successful and what its potential yield might be. Thus, we 
can speculate on tvro possible explanations for this change in the yield of 
exploratory drilling. The first one would simply imply that the wells were 
not deep enough (as reflected in the decrease of the average drilling depth 
of some 1.500 feet in the period from 1970 to 1905) to discover large de- 
posits. Consequently, although the share of successful gas wells was 
increasing with respect to oil wells, only comparatively small fields were 
discovered, resulting in lower yield rates per well or foot drilled. An alter- 
native (perhaps more plausibte) explanation would be that the drilling 
statistics are distorted by specific conditions of the tax system, resulting 
in an important number of "tax write-off" drillings not aimed at discovery 
and subsequent production. I f  this were the case, such wells would distort 
the data by introducing a bias into the drilling statistics, e.g., wells would 
be reported as srlccessful even if only insignificant amounts of gas were 
discovered, thus decreasing the resulting yield ratios. Nevertheless. Fig- 
u re  2.13 suggests that the drilling depth is an impot-tant variable to be con- 
sidered for the potential success and yield ratios of a gas well. This is con- 
sistent with the indications that the success t-atios (in terms of resorrt.ce 
discovery) of deep wells (below 16,000 feet) have been extremely high i r ~  
the USA. In terms of resource recovery. however. not ail of these wells are 
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r epo r t ed  a s  successful due  t o  technical  o r  economic infeasibility of produc- 
tion (Whitmore. 1986). 
This brief account of technological improvements in drilling technology 
and historical  records  of US natural  gas finding r a t e s  indicate t ha t  t h e r e  is 
an increasing decoupling of oil and  methane technologies, although t h e  t rad-  
itional driIling technologies were practically identical, whether  t h e  well was 
explored f o r  oil o r  gas. This decoupling is suggested by eve r  deepe r  
explora tory  wells t ha t  exceeded  t h e  d e p t h s  a t  which one  could reasonably 
e x p e c t  t o  find oil during t h e  1950s. Thus, t h e  deepes t  wells drrring t h e  last 
t h r e e  decades were all drilled fo r  methane exploration. At t h e  same time. 
t h e  ra t io  of successful natural  gas wells has increased since 1900, while t h e  
ra t io  of successful oil wells ha s  decreased.  Therefore,  w e  find s t rong  evi- 
dence  t h a t  f u tu r e  improvements in drilling technologies will favor natural 
gas discoveries and improve yields, desp i te  t h e  fac t  t ha t  oil is still  t h e  dom- 
inant form of energy .  However, t h e  fu ture  improvements in drilling tech-  
nologies wlll also have t o  resul t  in large cost  reductions in o rde r  f o r  deep  
gas deposi ts  t o  become competitive with o t h e r  fossil resources.  
2.5.2. Oil and natural gae production 
Already t h e  generic  name "oil and gas" indicates t ha t ,  during most of i ts  
century-old his tory,  natural gas o r  methane was known a s  a by-p t -duc t  not 
only of oil exploration, but  also of oil production. During t h e  ear ly  days. 
natural  gas was essential.  bu t  o f ten  a nuisance t o  t h e  oil producer .  Methane 
p r e s su re  in an  oil and  gas deposit se rved  t o  pump t h e  oil t o  t h e  surface.  but 
it was a nuisance because t h e  gas t ha t  actually reached t h e  sur face  had to 
b e  f lared in o r d e r  t o  avoid t h e  danger of explosion. Thus, natural  gas was in 
fac t  ex t r ac t ed  toge ther  with oil, bu t  was usually wasted. At t h e  same time, 
c i t y  gas (mostly methane) was being produced from coal and oil t o  supply 
premium fuel, especiaIly f o r  lighting and domestic uses. It is not surprising. 
then ,  t ha t  some associated gas was soon used for  consumption. 
According t o  S c h u r r  et al. (1960). t h e  earl iest  recorded commercial 
use of natural gas in t h e  New World da tes  back t o  1821 (at t h e  time when 
coal was supplying just 1% of primary energy,  and fuel wood and d r a f t  
animals t h e  res t ) .  when i t  was used a s  lighting fuel in Fredonia, New York. 
Natural gas continued t o  b e  used sporadically throughout t h e  nineteenth 
cen tu ry .  The f i r s t  pipeline was cons t ruc ted  from Murrysville t o  Pittsburgh 
(Pennsylvania) in 1883, a f t e r  t h e  discovery of a large well in 1878. Despite 
such  pioneering projects  by t h e  emerging oil and gas industry,  methane was 
generally considered t o  b e  a waste product .  Ry 1878, both c rude  oil and 
natural  gas passed t h e  1% s h a r e  in primary energy  consumption, but most of 
t h e  natural  gas consumed in t h e  following decades was used in t h e  vicinity of 
t h e  oil fields. 
Although s ta t i s t i cs  about natural gas disposal a r e  available only s ince 
1935, t hey  indicate t ha t ,  a t  t h a t  time, only 75% of t h e  gross natural gas pro- 
ri~rctinn was marketed and around 25X vented o r  flared. Natural gas waste 
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was probably considerably higher, s ince not all venting operations in t h e  
course of oil drilling may have been recorded.  Natural gas waste decreased. 
particularly in t h e  period a f t e r  1940. through increasing uses of natural gas 
for repressrrring. Still, i t  is interesting t o  no te  t ha t  i t  took until 1971 
hefore natural gas wastes were virtually eliminated, being reduced l o  
account for  less than 1% of total gross production. a s  indicated in F i g r ~ r e  
2.14 (data from S c h u r t  et al., 1960, and AGA, 1972,1975, 1979, and 1984). 
Fraction ( f )  
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F t g u r e  2-14. US natural gas deposilion. 
Natural gas production since t h e  tut-ti of t h e  cen tury  has grown 
rapidly, but because, until t h e  last decades, most methane discoveries were 
related t o  t h e  s ea r ch  for  oil, natural gas extract ion was mainly associated 
with oil production. Accllrate s tat is t ics  of natural gas production from oil 
and gas wells (associated and nonassociated gas. respectively) a r e  not avail- 
able f o r  t h e  period before  1935. Hefner (1985) has suggested decoupling 
associated from nonassociated natural gas pt-oduction in o rde r  t o  assess  t h e  
difference, if any,  between methane production from oil and gas technolo- 
gies. Figure 2.15 shows t h e  s teady  increase in natural gas production from 
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2.5.3. Oil and gas transport 
Fraction ( f )  
0.99 
figure 2.15. U S  natural gas  producLlon from oil and gas wells. 
from oil wells (oil technology). but  i t  also shows t h a t  by  t h e  end  of t h e  cen- 
t u r y  90% of production should b e  from nonassociated deposi ts .  The decreas -  
ing s h a r e s  of associated gas in total  production i l lustrate  t h e  fac t  t h a t  t h e  
natural  gas indus t ry  is in t h e  process  of decoupling itself from oil. Thus. 
t h e  closely re la ted  ex t rac t ion ,  t r a n s p o r t ,  conversion. and end-use technolo- 
gies f o r  oil and  methane may b e  slowly diverging toward incr-easingly 
independent  paths.  
This is encouraging, s ince  i t  indicates a possible n e x t  s t e p  in t h e  
analysis of t h e  evolution of methane technologies. The division of natur-a1 
gas in to  oil and  gas technologies indicates t h a t  i t  is conceivable t h a t  t h e  oil 
and  natural  gas industr ies  may also decouple downstream, going perhaps  all 
t h e  way t o  t h e  final energy  consumer. To investigate th i s  possibility, we 
will n e x t  consider  t h e  evolution of d i f fe ren t  energy  t r a n s p o r t  technologies 
and  especially t h e  development of liquid and  gaseous energy  t ranspor t .  
During t h e  last  few decades, energy  became t ru ly  a globally t raded  commod- 
ity. Especially c r u d e  oil and  i ts  products ,  bu t  t o  a l esse r  e x t e n t  also LNG 
(liquefied natural  gas) and some high-grade coals, a r e  t ranspor ted  around 
t h e  wor-Id. A t  t h e s e  global dis tances,  t a n k e r s  and o t h e r  vessels a r e ,  a t  least 
for  t h e  time being, t h e  most eff ic ient  mode of energy  t ranspor t .  Over con- 
tinental dis tances,  however, t h e r e  is a vigorous competition between many 
al ternat ive t ranspor t  modes, some of them dedicated t o  t ranspor t  of a par-  
ticular energy  form, s i ~ c h  a s  electr ic i ty .  Crude oil, oil products .  and natural 
gas especially a r e  t ranspor ted  by  a number of different  t ranspor t  modes 
including barges, vessels, t rucks .  t ra ins .  and pipelines. 
In c o n t r a s t  to long-distance oil and gas t r a n s p o r t  t o  t h e  consumer. 
wood was primarily consumed locally, close t o  t h e  source.  Some fuel wood 
was t ranspor ted  over  longer dis tances,  mostly by  r iver  flotation. and dis tr i -  
buted by waterways o r  roads. Coal, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, r e p r e s e n t s  a more 
concentrated form of energy  than fuel wood, and coal mines a r e  a more con- 
cen t ra ted  source  than f o r e s t s  (since coal has  a higher  hea t  con ten t  p e r  
unit weight than  wood) s o  t h a t  coal was generally t ranspor ted  over  longer 
d i s ta r~ces  than  fuel wood. An e x t r e m e  c a s e  is t h e  modest overseas coal 
t ranspor t  (for instance. t h e  coal e x p o r t s  from England t o  t h e  continent); 
but more usually coal was t ranspor ted  nationwide by  barges,  t ra ins ,  or- 
t rucks (ear l ier  by  horse wagons). Thus, t h e  sh i f t  from a wood- t o  coal-based 
economy was accompanied by  t h e  expansion of energy  t r a n s p o r t  over  longer 
distances and by  an increasing number of t ranspor t  modes. 
The widespread use of c r u d e  oil brought ano ther  t ranspor t  mode in 
addition t o  tankers .  t ra ins ,  and t r u c k s  - oil pipelines. Pipelines a r e  
becoming an important f re igh t  t ranspor t  mode with market s h a r e s  in total 
ton-kilometers p e r  y e a r  comparable t o  those of t ra in and t ruck  t ranspor t .  
They a r e  also comparable t o  railways in terms of t h e  total length of t h e  
in f ras t ruc ture  o r  grid: today t h e  total length of main t r a c k  in t h e  USA is 
about 200.000 miles, slightly s h o r t e r  than  c r u d e  oil pipelines, which total 
about 230,000 miles. I t  is interest ing t o  note  t h a t  in terms of ton- 
kilometers, c a r  loads. and revenue, coal t ranspor t  r e p r e s e n t s  by f a r  thc: 
largest commodity group in rail  t r anspor t .  Thus, although t h e  total length 
of t h e  rail and oil pipeline gr ids  is equivalent, t h e  big d i f fe rence  between 
the  two infrastructr l res  is tha t ,  s ince t h e  1920s. t h e  railroad system has 
beet) declining while oil pipelines have been expanding (see Nakicenovic. 
1986). Figure 2.16 shows t h e  rapid increase in pipeline length for  c r u d e  oil 
and petroleum products  in t h e  USA. 
The expansion of t h e  oil pipeline grid parallels t h e  increase of t h e  
crude oil s h a r e  in total  primary energy  consumption. Oil reached  a 1% s h a r e  
in energy  during t h e  1880s. and a t  t h e  same time t h e  rapid increase  i r ~  oil 
pipeline mileage s t a r t e d  and followed exponential t r e n d s  until t h e  1930s 
( the  inflection point occur red  in 1937). A s  if by  coincidence, oil's largest  
competitor, coal, r eached  i t s  maximum s h a r e  in primary energy  during t h e  
same decade.  Thus. by  1937. about half of t h e  c u r r e n t  length of t h e  oil 
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f i g u r e  2.H. US crude and product oll pipeline length 
pipeline network was a l ready  in place, and  t h e  growth r a t e s  declined slowly. 
During t h e  1980s. t h e  length should reach  t h e  asymptotic level a t  about  t h e  
same time a s  c r u d e  oil s h a r e s  in total  primary energy  reach  saturat iou.  The 
time cons tan t  ( A t )  of t h e  expansion of oil pipelines is 6 2  years  o r  halfway 
between t h e  time cons tan ts  f o r  t h e  expansion of rail  t r a c k s  and surfaced 
roads of about 5 0  and  74 years .  respect ively (see Nakicenovic. 1986). 
Although oil is still  t h e  mmt  important energy  source ,  in terms of pr-i- 
mary e n e r g y  consumption i t  is slowly being rep laced  by natural  gas. Figure 
2.25 has  shown t h a t  t h e  amount of associated natural  gas is decreasing in 
total natural  gas production and, there fore ,  t h a t  higher  natural  gas t rans -  
p o r t  and  end-use a r e  based more on gas a n d  less  on oil technologies. This 
p rocess  is also re f lec ted  in t h e  increase  of na tura l  gas t r a n s p o r t  and distri- 
bution pipelines when compared with oil pipelines, shown in Figure 2.16. A s  
mentioned above, t h e  f i r s t  natural  gas pipeline in t h e  USA da tes  back t o  t h e  
1880s. The rap id  expansion of t h e  natural  gas pipeline network. however. 
s t a r t e d  during t h e  1890s. o r  about  20  years  a f t e r  t h e  growth of oil pipelines 
was initiated. Figure  2.17 shows t h a t  th i s  20-year sh i f t  in time pers i s t s  
through most of t h e  growth cyc le  of t h e  natural  gas t r a n s p o r t  system and 
dis tr ibut ion in f ras t ruc ture .  
F i g u r e  2.17. US natural gas pipeline length. 
The inflection point,  with about half t h e  eventual saturat ion level 
achieved, occur red  in 1962, o r  2 5  years  a f t e r  t h e  inflection in t h e  growth of 
oil pipelines. Since t h e  time constant  is about 55 years ,  and  there fore  com- 
parable t o  t h a t  of oil pipelines (62 years),  saturat ion should also occur  more 
than 20  years  l a te r .  during t h e  2020s. Again, this  is symmetrical with t h e  
relationship between t h e  growth phases of oil pipelines and  oil penetrat ion 
in primary energy.  The growth pulse s t a r t e d  when oil achieved a I.% s h a r e  
of primary energy,  inflection occur red  during t h e  time when oil became t h e  
second largest  energy  source  (bypassing fuel wood), and saturat ion of pipe- 
line length was synchronous with t h e  saturat ion of market  shares .  Exactly 
t h e  same p a t t e r n  can b e  observed during t h e  growth pulse of gas pipelines 
by comparing Figures  2.17 and 2.5'. The growth s t a r t e d  toward t h e  end of 
t h e  last  cen tury  when natural  gas achieved a 1% s h a r e  In primary energy.  
The inflection point was reached in 1962, when natural  gas became t h e  
second largest  energy  source  (bypassing coal), and saturat ion of both 
natural gas market  s h a r e s  and length of pipeline should b e  achieved during 
t h e  2020s. 
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A large difference between the  growth pulses of oil and gas pipelines 
is in the  length of the  respective transport and dist.ributlon networks. Fig- 
u r e  2.16 gives a saturation level estimate fo r  oil pipeline length or about 
240.000 miles (or about the  current length of railroad tracks: see Nakiceno- 
vic, 1986), whereas the  asymptotic level for the  length of gas pipelines is 
estimated a t  more than 1.300.000 miles (more than five times higher). For 
the  time being, natural gas is transported almost exclusively through the  
pipeline grid. Oil and petroleum products, however, a re  also shipped by 
tankers. trains, trucks and, fo r  some military use. even by aircraft. Aside 
from some smaller quantities of liquefied natural gas and liquid natural gas 
products, most natural gas reaches the  consumer either in a gaseous form o r  
as electricity. The pipeline network for gas transport and distribution is 
therefore also much longer than that  for crude oil and petroleum products. 
This poses t h e  question of whether w e  can expect natural gas to continue to  
be transported almost exclusively by pipelines in the  future, especially if 
its projected use expands as dramatically as illustrated in F i g u r e  2..7. For 
liquid natural gas products especially, it is likely that  other- transport 
modes will also be  used, conceivably even aircraft. From the  technical point 
of view, there  a r e  in principle no obstacles to  using this transport mode for 
energy; the  only question is whether it would be economical and competitive 
to do so. 
This point cannot be resolved here,  but we mention this alternative for 
the  future because similar solutions have been found in the  past to  meet t h e  
ever increasing need to transport more energy over longer distances. 
Denser and cleaner ener-gy forms were technological measures needed to 
improve the  performance of the  whole energy system. We can therefore 
expect further improvements in t h e  near future,  and these could be ful- 
filled by a stronger reliance on natural gas. 
2.5.4 Energy substitution and end-use 
Natural gas exploration. production, and transport indicate significantly 
different trends from oil technologies, although natural gas has been associ- 
ated with the  oil industry ever since its first commercial use. Nevertheless. 
most energy accounts bind natural gas t o  oil because of the  large production 
of associated natural gas from oil wells. Except a t  the  point of production. 
associated natural gas, o r  oil-technology gas, is indistinguishable from gas 
produced from natural gas wells. The fact that  this distinction is d i f f i c~~ l t  
to make, and is consequently ignored in historical data, is t o  an extent 
misleading since we have shown that  oil and gas technology have followed 
distinctly different trends during the  last century. In addition, the  distinc- 
tion between associated gas and crude oil in terms of primary energy 
accounting is consistent with adding city gas produced from oil or  coal to  
these  primary energy sources ra ther  than to  natural gas. To investigate 
the  hypothesis that  natural gas is becoming increasingly decoupled from oil 
technolopies, we have attempted to reconstruct the  primary energy 
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balances by adding associated gas t o  crude oil and subtracting the  same 
amount from natural gas consumption (but leaving net imports with natural 
gas balances). 
F i g u r e  2.3% shows the  resulting refined version of the  primary energy 
substitution dynamics from F i g u r e  2.6 in the case of the  USA. This revised 
technological substitution process can be characterized by very regular, 
time corlstants because the  historical data a r e  apparently accurate enough 
to provide the  information required for further analytical resoli~tion. This 
is possible in the  case of primary energy cotisumption because different 
energy sources can be measured in common (physical, energy) units and 
because their  use is relatively well documented in the  USA for the last 190 
f l ( 1  - f )  Fraction ( f )  
Figure 2.18. U S  energy subslltulion and gas technologies. 
years. F i g u r e  2.18 represents such a higher resolution because associated 
natural gas (oil technology from F i g u r e  2.15) is now reallocated to t t ~ c  I I S ~ :  
of crude oil, leaving only the  nonassociated gas from gas wells (including 
natural gas imports) to  "gas technology". 
This result shows that. although associated gas has long been available 
as a by-product of oil, its use does not represent the  actual evolr~tion of gas 
technologies. F i g u r e  2.18 shows that this refinement of the  substitution 
process improves the regularity to the  extent that the  time constants now 
cluster a t  about 70 years for all energy sources arid that the saturatiol~ 
irltervals between coal, oil, and gas technologies are  all separated by about 
50 years. Dur.ing the saturation pe~.iods of the  domina~~t  energy sources, 
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new ones a r e  introduced. Gas technologies are introduced during t h e  
saturat ion of coal, and nuclear energy  during t h e  saturat ion of oil. The 
actual  oil sha r e s  (with associated gas) have now increased s o  t ha t  t h e  impor- 
t ance  of oil during t h e  last decades can  b e  seen  a s  clearly dominating more 
than  half of all  energy  supplies. 
This resul t  is encouraging since i t  Indicates a possible next  s t e p  i r ~  t h e  
analysis of t h e  evolution of methane technologies. The division of natural 
gas into oil and gas technologies suggests t h a t  t h e  two industries may also 
decouple downstream. pe rhaps  all t h e  way t o  t h e  final energy  consumer. In 
o r d e r  t o  investigate this  possibillty. we consider  t h e  evolution of natural 
gas end-use in different  s ec to r s  of t h e  economy. 
The consumer is  faced with t h e  decision of choosing t h e  final energy 
form of p r e f e r ence  and seldom a t t ends  t o  t h e  origin of al ternat ive fuels. 
Thus, t h e  difference between associated and nonassociated natural gas can- 
not b e  made a t  t h e  level of energy  end-use. Instead, we can view t h e  t rends  
in total natural  gas use a t  t h e  level of t h e  whole economy, but cannot distin- 
guish between oil and  gas technologies. 
F i g u r e  2.19 shows t h e  competition of different  b ranches  of t h e  US  
economy fo r  natural  gas. The substitution process is very regular with mod- 
est fluctuations of actual  da ta  from model estimates 121. Therefore,  t h e  
example i l lustrates  a continuous and s t e ady  t r end  toward g r ea t e r  use of 
natural  gas in t h e  residential and commercial sec tors .  At t h e  same time, t h e  
s h a r e  of natural  gas used fo r  industrial purposes is decreasing. This result 
c learly shows t h a t  natural  gas does indeed have t h e  charac te r i s t ics  of a 
premium fuel. Industry usually has more technological opportuni t ies  to 
switch between fuels and t o  implement environmental control when d i r t i e r  
fuels a r e  utilized. Residential and commercial sec tors ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand. 
usually r ep r e sen t  smaller-scale users  in relatively densely populated areas.  
Thus, i t  is natural t o  expec t  t ha t  t h e  cleanest  available fuel should be  util- 
ized. Next t o  e lec t r ic i ty ,  natural  gas is t h e  cleanest  final energy  form. 
With eve r  more s t r ingent  environmental controls and an increasing 
need for  convenience in energy  end-use, th i s  t r end  toward larger  sha r e s  of 
natural  gas used in residential and  commercial s ec to r s  should be  expec ted  
t o  continue, a s  Figure  2.19 suggests. Considering t ha t  many studies  indi- 
c a t e  t ha t  t h e  c u r r e n t  economic s t ~ c t ~ r a l  changes in t h e  industrialized 
countr ies  favor expansion of t h e  se rv ice  s e c t o r  compared with manufactur- 
ing. F i g u r e  2.19 implies t ha t  th i s  res t ruc tur ing  process would also favor an 
increased use of natural gas, s ince increasing sha r e s  of natural gas a r e  con- 
sumed in t h e  residential and commercial sector-s. Thus, growing sec tors  car) 
b e  expec t ed  t o  become t h e  largest  natural  gas consumers, while industry 
and  especially some t ranspor t  modes may rely more on liquid energy  car-  
r ie rs .  This does not preclude t h e  possibility t ha t ,  in addition t o  electr ici ty.  
liquid energy  forms may b e  produced from natural  gas in t h e  next  decades.  
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Figure 2.19. U S  natural gas use by economic sector. 
2.5. Conclusions 
In a number of examples analyzed in th i s  chap t e r ,  we have shown t h a l  Lhe 
growth and senescence of energy technologies can be  described as  a regular- 
process with logistic secular  t rends.  The dynamics of primary energy sub- 
stitution in t h e  world and most of t h e  countr ies  and regions analyzed t o  da t e  
(see, a.g., Marchetti  and Nakicenovic, 1979, and Nakicenovic, 1984) indicate 
that  r~a tura l  gas could become t h e  energy source of choice during t h e  com- 
ing decades. In this chap t e r ,  we have considered this transition from oil t o  
gas a s  t h e  dominant source  of energy  a t  different  s tages of t h e  energy  sys- 
tem from exploration and production t o  energy consumption and end-use. 
Throughout t h e  energy system, t h e r e  a r e  c lear  indications t ha t  natural gas 
technologies (e.g., exploration and transport)  a r e  still in t h e  growth phase.  
whereas oil technologies a r e  apparent ly close t o  saturation. Most of t h e  
examples analyzed h e r e  a r e  from t h e  USA, primarily because of t h e  IJS 
leadership in natural gas use and technologies in t h e  pas t ,  and because or 
daLa availability. 
The refined version of t h e  primary energy substitution process in Lhn 
USA, based 011 decoupling oil and gas production technologies a s  shown i l l  
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F i g u r e  2.1.8. i nd ica tes  t h a t  technological subs t i tu t ion  c a n  b e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
by  v e r y  r egu la r  t ime c o n s t a n t s ,  provided t h a t  t h e  his tor ical  d a t a  a r e  accu-  
r a t e  enough to s u p p l y  t h e  information requ i red  f o r  f u r t h e r  analyt ical  reso- 
lution. In t h i s  example ,  a s soc ia ted  na tu ra l  gas  i s  r ea l loca ted  t o  oil technol-  
ogy,  a n d  nonassocia ted gas  f rom gas  wells to gas  technology.  This r e f ine -  
ment  of t h e  subs t i tu t ion  p r o c e s s  s o  improves t h e  r egu la r i ty  t h a t  t h e  time 
c o n s t a n t s  c l u s t e r  a t  abou t  70 y e a r s  f o r  all e n e r g y  sources ;  a n d  t h e  s a t u r a -  
t ion in te rva l s  between coal ,  oil, and gas  technologies  a r e  a lso  s e p a r a t e d  by  
a b o u t  50 y e a r s .  During t h e  sa tu ra t ion  pe r iods  of t h e  dominant e n e r g y  
s o u r c e s ,  new o n e s  a r e  in t roduced .  Gas  technologies  a r e  in t roduced  dur ing  
t h e  s a t u r a t i o n  of coal,  a n d  nuc lea r  e n e r g y  d u r i n g  t h e  sa tu ra t ion  of oil 
( including assoc ia ted  gas  technologies).  T h e  pene t ra t ion  r a t e  of gas  techno-  
logies is comparab le  t o  t h e  p e n e t r a t i o n  r a t e  of oil a n d  coal,  leading eventu-  
ally to a similar p a t t e r n  of marke t  pene t ra t ion  and a resul t ing marke t  domi- 
n a n c e  in t h e  n e x t  c e n t u r y .  
f/(l - f )  = HIC Fraction f = H/ (C  + H )  
World 
Wood H/C = 0.1 
Coal HIC = 1 
Oil HIC = 2 
n t = 320 years Gas H/C = 4 
10-2 
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Thus,  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  na tu ra l  gas  use  has  not inc reased  mucli 
dur ing t h e  l a s t  few y e a r s ,  in c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  growth r a t e s  e x p e r i e n c e d  d u r -  
ing t h e  e a r l i e r  d e c a d e s ,  o u r  r e su l t s  ind ica te  t h a t  t h e  growth potent ia l  of 
na tu ra l  gas  technologies i s  s t i l l  v e r y  large ,  especia l ly  when compared w i t t i  
oil technologies.  which a p p e a r  t o  b e  r each ing  sa tu ra t ion  in t h e  USA. I t  is 
very likely t h a t  t h i s  potent ia l  f o r  improving na tu ra l  gas  technology will con-  
t inue dur ing  t h e  coming decades ,  leading t o  t h e  development of s p e c i f i c  
technologies ta i lored t o  na tu ra l  gas  t h a t  will not  be mere  der ivat ives  of oil 
techr~ologies ,  a s  t h e y  have been  in t h e  p a s t .  A pre requ i s i t e  f o r  t h e  
widespread u s e  of n a t r ~ r a l  gas  in t h e  f u t u r e  is, in o u r  opinion, t h e  decocrpling 
of me thane  from oil technologies,  a n d  th i s  p r o c e s s  was in i t ia ted long ago 
when associa ted gas  supp l i ed  most of t h e  na tu ra l  gas  consrtmed. Our resrll ts 
show t h a t  t h e  dynamics of e n e r g y  subs t i tu t ion  a n d  methane  technologies 
r e p r e s e n t  evolutionary. r a t h e r  than  revolutionary. p rocesses  t h a t  could 
meet more s t r i n g e n t  f u t u r e  requirements  th rough  ref inements  a n d  improve- 
mcnts irr c u r r e n t  des igns  and p r a c t i c e s  dur ing  t h e  n e x t  two dccadns .  
Potentially,  me thane  is c l eane r ,  and  it may be dis t r ibr l ted abundant ly  and 
morc cvcnly throughout  t h e  world, thart o t h c r  fossil e n e r g y  sources .  
Thus,  me thane  fulfills most of t h e  obvious f u t u r e  requirements  f o r  
becoming t h e  major s o u r c e  of e n e r g y .  A bonus in t e r m s  of t h e  ve ry  long- 
term p r o s p e c t s  could b e  t h a t  t h e  na tu ra l  gas  economy can  pave t h e  way fot- 
a v a r y  clean hydrogen f u t u r e .  F i g u r e  2.20 (Marchetti .  1982) i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  
possibili ty of s u c h  a n  evo lu t io t~a ry  t ransi t ion in t h e  world from original reli-  
ance  on fuels with re la t ively  low to fuels with h igher  hydrogen c o n t e n t ;  
hydrogen-to-carbon ra t ios  were  calcula ted on t h e  basis of actual  e n e r g y  
consrrrnption, a s  specif ied in F i g u r e  2.20, f o r  wood, coal, oil, and  na tu ra l  gas.  
This t ransi t ion is p r e s e n t e d  a s  a "subst i tu t ion"  p r o c e s s  of hydrogeri 
f o r  c a r b o n  in t h e  to ta l  pr imary e n e r g y  consumption dur ing  t h e  l a s t  c e n t u r y  
F i g u r e  2.20 shows t h a t ,  a f t e r  th i s  c e n t u r y .  t h e  hydrogen-to-carbon ra t io  
may e x c e e d  t h e  level t h a t  can  b e  achieved by  p u r e  me thane  economy, imply- 
ing t h a t  some additional hydrogen could b e  needed  t o  supplement  t h e  
increasing re l i ance  on methane.  In t h e  meantime. t h e  na tu ra l  gas  s h a r e  in 
total  primat-y e n e r g y  should con t inue  t o  grow a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  of dirt ier- 
energy s o u r c e s  - coal and  oil. 
Notes 
[ I ]  Ona general  finding of a large number of studies Is l h a t  substitulion of ara 
old Lechnology by a new one, expressed i n  fraclional lerms, follows charac-  
ler is l ic  S-shaped curves.  Fisher and Pry (1971) formulated a simple bnl 
powerful model o f  lechnological subslllulion by postulaling lhal  the 
replacement of an old by a new Lechnology proceeds along the  logislic 
growlh curve: 
f igure  2.m. World hydrogen-lo-carbon ra t io  of primary energy 
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w h e r e  t Is  t h e  independent  v a r i a b l e  usually r e p r e s e n t i n g  some unit  of t ime,  
a and  f l  are c o n s t a n t s ,  f i s  t h e  f r a c t i o n a l  m a r k e t  s h a r e  of t h e  new competi-  
t o r ,  while 1 -f i s  t h a t  of t h e  o ld  one.  
In dealing with m o r e  t h a n  two competing technologies ,  we must g e n e r a l i z e  
t h e  F i s h e r  a n d  P r y  model. s l n c e  in  s u c h  c a s e s  logist ic  subs t i tu t ion  c a n n o t  b e  
p r e s e r v e d  in a l l  p h a s e s  of t h e  subs t i tu t ion  p r o c e s s .  E v e r y  compet i to r  
u n d e r g o e s  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  subs t i tu t ion  phases :  g rowth ,  s a t u r a t i o n ,  and  
dec l ine .  This  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  subs t i tu t ion  p a t h  of c o a l ,  which c u r v e s  
t h r o u g h  a maximum f rom i n c r e a s i n g  t o  declining m a r k e t  s h a r e s  ( s e e  M g u r e  
3.2). In t h e  model of t h e  subs t i tu t ion  p r o c e s s ,  we assume t h a t  only one  com- 
p e t i t o r  i s  in  t h e  s a t u r a t i o n  p h a s e  at a n y  g iven  time, t h a t  decl ining technolo- 
g i e s  f a d e  away s tead i ly  a t  log is t ic  r a t e s ,  a n d  t h a t  new compet i to rs  e n t e r  t h e  
m a r k e t  a n d  g r o w  at logist ic  rales. As a r e s u l t ,  t h e  s a t u r a t i n g  technology i s  
l e f t  with t h e  r e s i d u a l  m a r k e t  s h a r e s  (i.e.. t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between 1 and t h s  
sum of f r a c t i o n a l  m a r k e t  s h a r e s  of a l l  o t h e r  c o m p e t i t o r s  - growing or de-  
cl ining) a n d  i s  f o r c e d  to follow a nonlogist ic  p a t h  t h a t  joins i t s  p e r i o d  of 
g r o w t h  to i t s  s u b s e q u e n t  p e r l o d  of dec l ine .  A f t e r  t h e  c u r r e n t  s a t u r a t i n g  
c o m p e t i t o r  h a s  r e a c h e d  a logist ic  r a t e  of dec l ine ,  t h e  n e x t  o ldes t  compcti-  
t o r  e n t e r s  i t s  s a t u r a t i o n  phase .  a n d  t h e  p r o c e s s  i s  r e p e a t e d  until a l l  b u t  t h e  
most  r e c e n t  c o m p e t i t o r s  are in dec l ine .  A more  comprehens ive  d e s c r i p t i o n  
of t h e  model a n d  t h e  assumpt ions  i s  g iven  in Nakicenovic (1979). 
[Z] In f a c t .  t h i s  example  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  p r e d i c t i v e  power  of t h e  logist ic  subs t i -  
tu t ion  a p p r o a c h  in f o r e c a s t i n g  m a r k e t  s h a r e s .  This p a r t i c u l a r  example  was 
r e p o r t e d  in  Marche t t i  a n d  Nakicenovic (1979). with d a t a  up to 1976,  so t h a t  
t h e  p e r i o d  f rom 1 9 7 6  to 1 9 8 5  r e p r e s e n t s  a n  a c t u a l  f o r e c a s t  of nine y e a r s .  
Comparison with t h e  or ig ina l  publ ica t ion  shows t h a t  t h e  f o r e c a s t  was exce l -  
l en t ,  within a few p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  and  res ident ia l  s e c t o r s  
a n d  p r e c i s i o n  b e t t e r  t h a n  1% f o r  t h e  commercial  s e c t o r .  
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